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This paper uses regression analyses to explain the different output 
performance in the 27 countries in the EU based on measures of their 
pre-existing vulnerability and resilience. Rapid financial deepening and 
high  financial  leverage,  both  domestically  and  externally,  were  fol-
lowed by larger output losses during the crisis. The level of financial 
depth, on the other hand, did not affect output negatively. A large de-
gree of trade openness was associated with weaker output performance, 
possibly because of falling export demand during the crisis. Finally, 
government deficits and debt stocks do not seem have impacted nega-
tively on output. The Baltic States stand out as having much explana-
tory power in the sample due to their large output losses during the 
crisis. 
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The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 led to extreme 
instability in global financial markets and, therefore, represents an important 
milestone in the unfolding of the crisis. The shock spread rapidly to the EU 
and eventually resulted in substantial downturns. It is noticeable, however, 
that the effect on output differed markedly across the 27 EU countries. The 
idea of this paper is to examine the extent to which differences in pre-existing 
economic fundamentals, measures of vulnerability and resilience, can explain 
the different economic performance across the 27 countries.  
A number of papers have examined the importance of various measures of 
pre-crisis  vulnerabilities  for  output  performance  after  the  global  financial 
crisis using different datasets, mostly consisting of emerging economies. This 
paper set out to assess whether the results of these econometric analyses are 
also applicable to the 27 countries in the European Union. The EU countries 
share many institutional characteristics, but exhibit substantial heterogeneity 
regarding economic development and their economic performance prior to 
the crisis.  
In the light of the limited number of observations, the empirical approach 
had to be kept simple; GDP growth during the crisis was regressed on ex-
planatory variables individually or jointly. The use of explanatory variables 
that are dated mainly to the time before the outbreak of the global financial 
crisis reduced concerns about reverse causality. The main problem facing the 
empirical analysis is the difficulty in identifying the effects of individual vul-
nerabilities given substantial multicollinearity and the small sample size. Our 
estimation  procedures  and  the  interpretation  of  the  results  seek  to  take 
account of the identification problems that emerge from multicollinearity and 
the small number of data points. 
The main finding in this paper is that the results for the EU countries are 
largely commensurable to those attained using different datasets mainly con-
sisting of emerging economies. The determinants of output performance after 
the outbreak of the global financial crisis in the EU countries can be summa-
rised as follows:  
1.  Variables depicting financial leverage and financial deepening, both do-
mestically and externally, appear to have substantial explanatory power. 
This includes variables such as private loans growth, current account def-
icits, loans-to-deposits and the net international investment position.  
2.  Variables depicting the level of financial depth have either little explana-
tory power or may even have contributed to a better output performance. 
This may signify that countries with deep financial markets have been 
better able to take measures counter-acting the effects of the crisis.    3 
3.  Variables directly or indirectly capturing the effects on trade also proved 
to be of importance. Countries with large trade volumes prior to the crisis 
or with trading partners that suffered from large output contractions have 
been adversely affected.  
4.  Government deficits or government debt stocks do not seem to have af-
fected output negatively, signifying that countries with more profligate 
governments  have  not  been  punished  in  terms  of  output  losses  in  the 
early stages of the global financial crisis. 
5.  Variables  proxying  the  economic  stance  or  the  degree  of  overheating 
prior to the crisis, i.e. the real effective exchange rate, inflation and the 
exchange rate system, do not provide consistent results in the estima-
tions. The financial sector variables have more explanatory power, possi-
bly because the pre-crisis economic stance in large part was determined 
by financial developments.  
6.  The Baltic States stand out for their very large output contractions during 
the global financial crisis. Unsurprisingly the inclusion of these countries 
matters a lot for the results, but this is also the case for other countries 
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“[T]he link between vulnerabilities 
and performance during crisis pe-
riods is neither simple nor straight-
forward.” 





After more than a year of strain in US financial markets, Lehman Brothers 
filed for bankruptcy in September 2008, and this came to signal the start of 
the global financial crisis.
1 In a short time the crisis spread to countries across 
the  world  and  liquidity  in  global  financial  markets  came  under  pressure, 
resulting in rapid de-leveraging, higher risk premiums and credit contraction 
(EC, 2009). More difficult financing conditions, declines in stock and real 
estate  markets  and  falling  business  and  consumer  confidence  led  to 
contractions  in  consumption  and  investment  demand  in  many  countries.
2 
Meanwhile export demand fell, as global trade contracted very rapidly. In a 
short time the problems in the financial sector in the USA had spread to the 
real economy in countries across the world, often leading to substantial GDP 
declines.  
Europe was among the hardest hit regions in terms of output decline. Fig-
ure 1 shows the output performance of the 27 EU countries from the third 
quarter 2008 to the third quarter 2009. The average output decline was 5.7 
percent  (unweighted),  but  there  was  substantial  heterogeneity  across  the 
Union and eight of the 27 countries experienced output losses in excess of 5 
percent. The countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) exhibited the 
most diverse performance; the three Baltic States, Latvia, Estonia and Lithua-
nia, stand out for their output declines of between 14 and 19 percent, while 
Poland was the only EU country to retain positive economic growth during 
the period.  
                                                 
1 The events and chronology of the global financial crisis have been discussed in e.g. 
Brunnermeier  (2009),  Blanchard  (2009),  EC  (2009),  IMF  (2009)  and  Keeley  and  Love 
(2010).  
2  Hall  (2010)  discusses  theories  linking  financial  distress  and  economic  activity; 
Cecchetti et al. (2009) provide an empirical analysis of the real effects of different forms of 









































































































































































































This paper seeks to explain the different output performance in the EU 
countries using measures of their pre-existing vulnerability and resilience. In 
other words, the objective is to cast light on the factors that have made coun-
tries particularly susceptible to the initial shock from the US and on the fac-
tors that have made countries more resilient to the shock. Output is an impor-
tant measure of economic welfare as it measures average income in society, 
but it may also affect unemployment, economic deprivation, etc.  
The econometric analysis consists of cross section estimations covering all 
or most of the 27 EU countries. The dependent variable is a measure of out-
put performance during the global financial crisis, while the explanatory vari-
ables are different measures capturing the countries’ initial conditions or vul-
nerabilities that existed prior to 2008.  
Only a small number of studies use econometric methods to investigate 
the impact of the global financial crisis on output performance across differ-
ent countries. Although the studies have used different country and time sam-
ples, the overall results are quite similar. The analyses find a robust associa-
tion between credit growth prior to the crisis and GDP growth during the 
crisis. Pre-crisis financial leverage, openness to trade and the pre-crisis cur-
rent account balance are typically also found to help explain the output per-
formance during the crisis.    7 
Berglof et al. (2009) analyse the effect of the global financial crisis on out-
put in emerging Europe using a sample which includes Central and Eastern 
European countries inside and outside the EU, Central Asian countries and 
Turkey. The study finds that the size of the growth in the credit-to-GDP ratio 
2005–2008, higher total external debt at the end of 2007, and hard pegs are 
predictors of larger declines in GDP during the crisis. In some specifications, 
the FDI stock as a share of GDP shows a positive association with GDP 
growth during the crisis. 
Berkmen et al. (2009) analyse the impact of the crisis across a larger sam-
ple of developing and emerging countries. They compare the revisions of 
countries’ growth forecasts before and after the crisis struck and find that the 
growth revision can be explained by rapid credit growth and high leverage, 
after controlling for the choice of exchange rate system.  
Blanchard et al. (2010) also consider a sample of emerging markets, albeit 
consisting of only 29 countries. As dependent variable they use “unexpected 
growth”, which is computed as the difference between actual GDP growth in 
2009 and forecasts made prior to the crisis. They find that the financial chan-
nel, in the form of short-term foreign debt, and to a lesser degree the trade 
channel, measured by trade-weighed growth in partner countries, help ex-
plain the heterogeneity in outcomes across the 29 countries.  
Claessens et al. (2010) use a sample of 58 emerging and developed mar-
kets and analyse the association between pre-crisis conditions and various 
economic  performance  indicators  such  as  the  duration  of  the  recession, 
whether there was a decline in GDP, the income loss during the crisis, and 
the change in the growth rate as compared to the average in the pre-crisis pe-
riod. They find that housing price increases, credit growth, and the current 
account balance prior to the crisis are of importance for the performance indi-
cators.  
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) examine the effect of pre-crisis macroeco-
nomic and financial variables on the incidence and severity of the crisis using 
different global samples of up to 160 countries. They find that pre-crisis vari-
ables that capture the level of economic development, the growth in private 
credit to GDP, the current account and openness to trade help to explain the 
intensity of the crisis. 
Olafsson and Petursson (2010) use a dataset comprising 46 medium-to-
high income countries. They seek to explain the depth and the duration of the 
output loss along with the probability of different forms of financial crisis 
occurring. They find that a large part of the accumulated output loss can be 
explained by initial conditions such as pre-existing inflation, the size of the   8 
banking sector, the  exchange rate system, international trade linkages  and 
institutional factors.  
This paper follows the studies above by using cross-country estimations to 
explain the output performance of the 27 EU countries during the crisis, an 
exercise which has not hitherto been undertaken on this sample of countries.
3 
The choice of sample has one major drawback, which is that the sample is 
relatively small, never exceeding 27 countries. The limited number of obser-
vations aggravates problems associated with outliers and multicollinearity, 
but other studies have gained important insights using similarly small data-
sets, e.g. Berglof et al. (2009) and Blanchard et al. (2010).  
The choice of sample has several important advantages. First, most of the 
data can be sourced from Eurostat. The database covers all the EU countries 
and provides good data comparability since data are collected by national 
statistical offices following a unified set of rules and subsequently reported to 
Eurostat. 
Second, the EU countries share an overall institutional structure, as they 
form a single market with free movement of goods, capital, services and peo-
ple. The countries are in this sense equally susceptible to external economic 
shocks. There are nevertheless noticeable differences between the economies 
of the 27 EU countries as they differ in their economic development, eco-
nomic structure, macroeconomic performance and financial exposure. Most 
notably, the EU consists of advanced economies that have been highly inte-
grated for decades and the emerging economics from Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. 
Third, despite the unified institutional structure, the EU countries have in 
practice often exhibited diverging cyclical performance as the countries have 
been hit by different shocks or symmetric shocks have affected the countries 
in different ways. This is corroborated in the survey by de Haan et al. (2008) 
which  concludes  that  the  business  cycles  of  many  euro  countries  are  un-
synchronised and that there is no clear movement towards a single European 
business cycle. This conclusion appears to hold for countries even after they 
have joined the EMU (Giannone et al., 2009). The finding that the business 
cycles  are  not  tightly  synchronised  in  the  EU  countries  suggests  that  the 
effects  of  a  global  financial  crisis  may  have  had  different  output  effects 
across the EU countries.  
                                                 
3 An alternative approach is to use panel data estimations as in e.g. Brezinski and Stephan 
(2010). Such estimations assume, however, time-invariant effects from the explanatory varia-
bles to the dependent variable, which may not be satisfied given the fundamentally different 
economic regimes before and during the crisis.    9 
A final argument for considering the different effects of the global finan-
cial crisis on countries across the EU pertains to the policy debates on eco-
nomic governance that the crisis has fostered within the Union. The European 
Commission has proposed tools for enhanced economic policy coordination, 
which include broader macroeconomic surveillance in addition to further fis-
cal policy coordination (EC, 2010). The aim is to establish a scoreboard of 
indicators and alert thresholds for each indicator to draw attention to coun-
tries with problematic levels of macroeconomic imbalances. Several indica-
tors such as the current account balance, the net foreign asset position, the 
real effective exchange rate, government debt, real estate prices and the ratio 
of private sector credit growth to GDP have been proposed. Evidently, the 
relevance of each of these indicators rests on whether the indicator makes a 
country more susceptible to financial and economic crises (Caballero et al., 
2006).  
This paper contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, it ana-
lyses the spread of the global financial crisis to the 27 countries in the Euro-
pean Union. The sample comprises essentially the entire European region, a 
region sharing many institutional and structural features. Second, the avail-
able time sample is relatively long, covering the entire downturn from the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers until the beginning of 2010. This time sample 
allows us to examine the effect on output at different horizons. Finally, the 
explanatory power of a very large set of vulnerability measures is examined.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 sets out a concept-
tual framework of the spreading of crises to guide the empirical analyses. 
Section 3 presents the data used in the empirical analyses. Section 4 reports 
the results of the econometric analyses using only variables that capture vul-
nerabilities that existed prior to the crisis. Section 5 reports the empirical 
results when concurrent trade partner growth is included as a control variable. 
Finally, Section 6 summarises the results.  
 
 
2. A conceptual framework  
 
To guide the empirical analyses, this section sets out a framework concep-
tualising the spread of the crisis from the US financial sector to the real eco-
nomy in European countries. The starting point is the literature on contagion 
of economic and financial crises across countries as developed by Masson 
(1999).  
Crises  can  occur  simultaneously  because  the  economies  are  hit  by  the 
same common shock. During the global financial crisis, economic develop-
ments in the USA directly affected the countries in Europe through trade and   10 
financial channels. Masson (1999) uses the term “monsoonal effect” to de-
scribe the occurrence of such common shocks. The contagion may also take 
place indirectly through a “spillover effect” if an economy which has been hit 
by the crisis subsequently affects other economies adversely through trade 
and financial channels. For example, during the global financial crisis, the 
economic downturn in Germany may have contributed to the downturn in 
many of its neighbours.  
The monsoonal and spillover effect are fundamental causes of contagion, 
where  changes  in  economic  variables  in  the  initial  crisis  country  lead  to 
changes in trade or financial flows. The original shock may, however, also 
set off changes in sentiment or expectations without underlying fundamental 
reasons, and the altered expectations may lead to a crisis and thus become 
self-fulfilling (Obstfeld, 1996; Masson, 1999).  During the  global  financial 
crisis, information about economic and financial crises in other countries may 
have triggered downward sentiment shifts or panics which had no underlying 
or fundamental reason. A crisis in one country may thus be contagious if it 
triggers  self-fulfilling  expectations  in  other  countries.  Such  expectations-
based contagion can be labelled “pure contagion”.  
The distinction between different sources of contagion is important from a 
policy viewpoint. Policy coordination between affected countries may, for in-
stance, be more effective if the contagion is expectations-driven (pure conta-
gion) while less effective if caused by a common shock. The existence of 
pure or expectations-based contagion is sui generis hard to uncover empiri-
cally, but nevertheless of substantial importance from a policy point of view. 
The individual country’s economic circumstances at the outset of the crisis 
may also help explain differences in output performance. The degree of vul-
nerability or resilience may for instance be proxied by variables capturing 
the initial financial exposure, the public debt, the income level, etc. The vul-
nerability variables can play two roles:  
1)  The  vulnerability  variables  may  explain  the  magnitude  of  the  direct 
contagion shock and of the ensuing policy. An example would be large 
pre-crisis external liabilities, which facilitate capital outflows in a crisis. 
Another example would be the initial government debt stock, as a low 
debt  stock  may  allow  expansionary  fiscal  policies,  while  a  large  debt 
stock may rule out such a policy response. 
2)  The  vulnerability  variables  may  explain  the  sensitivity  of  output  to  a 
given contagion shock or policy measure. A capital outflow may have 
little effect on output in an economy which relies primarily on domestic 
financing, but have a large effect in an economy with a history of relying 
on capital imports. Similarly, expansionary fiscal policy may be counter-
productive in a country with a large pre-existing public debt as the result 
may be financing problems and loss of confidence.    11 
3. Data and variables  
 
The variables used in the empirical analysis are shown in Table 1 together 
with their summary statistics. The source of the data is mainly the Eurostat 
database. For the banking sector, data are extracted from the Statistical Data 
Warehouse of the ECB, which uses data from all the central banks in the EU. 
Some other variables are taken from the OECD, the Bank for International 
Settlements and the International Monetary Fund. The precise data source for 
each variable is given in Appendix A. 
 
 
Dependent variable  
 
The dependent variable is the percentage change in real GDP computed at 
different time intervals. As default, the dependent variable is the change in 
real GDP from the third quarter of 2008 to the third quarter of 2009. For 
robustness analyses, three other measures are computed, including the aver-
age change in real GDP growth in 2009 or the GDP growth over six quarters 
from the fourth quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2010. The growth rates 
of the EU countries differed considerably before the crisis, and to isolate the 
effect of the crisis a measure of the “unexpected GDP growth” is used which 
is  meant  to  provide  an  estimate  of  the  effect  of  the  crisis.  Following 
Blanchard et al. (2010) the unexpected GDP growth in 2009 is computed as 
the actual growth rate in 2009 minus the IMF forecast for 2009 published in 
the April 2008 issue of the World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2008a).  
The four different measures of GDP growth after the global financial crisis 
are shown in Figure 2. The three measures of actual GDP growth are closely 
correlated although it clearly follows that the timing of the declines in GDP 
varied across the countries. The unexpected GDP growth broadly follows the 
actual GDP growth in 2009, but the discrepancy is larger for the CEE coun-
tries than for the EU countries in Western Europe (EU15), since in April 
2008 the CEE countries were forecast to have higher growth rates than the 
EU15 countries.  
   12 
Table 1: Variables and summary statistics 
 
Variable  Denomination  Mean  S.D.  Min.  Max.  Obs. 
GDP growth 2008:3–2009:3  Percent    –5.68   4.45  –19.10   1.20  27 
GDP growth 2009  Percent    –5.51   4.24  –18.00   1.70  27 
GDP growth 2008:3–2010:1  Percent    –5.44   5.01  –19.59   3.22  27 
Unexpected GDP growth 
2009  Percent   






  –2.75 
 
27 
Private loans 2007   Share of GDP   1.06   0.62   0.28   3.00  27 
Private loans growth  
2005–2007 












Loans-to-deposits 2007  Ratio   1.26   0.42   0.63   2.38  27 
Gross international liabilities 
2007










Net international investment 
position 2007  Share of GDP   









Current account balance 
2007   Percent of GDP   









Exports 2007  Share of GDP   0.59   0.32   0.23   1.77  27 
General government debt 
2007 
 











General government balance 
2007  Percent of GDP   









GDP 2007  Trillion EUR   0.46   0.69   0.01   2.43  27 
GDP per capita in PPS 2007  Thousand EUR  24.63  11.44   9.40  68.60  27 
Real effective exchange rate 










Average annual HICP 
inflation 2003–2007  Percent   3.09   1.91   1.02   9.56  27 
Exchange rate dummy: euro  ..   0.59  ..   0.00   1.00  27 
Exchange rate dummy: float   ..   0.22  ..   0.00   1.00  27 
Partner growth 2008:3–
2009:3
b  Percent    –2.27   1.45    –5.90    –0.74  27 
Unexpected partner growth 
2009
b  Percent    –3.22   1.80    –7.99    –1.05  27 
Note: 
a Luxembourg is excluded as its gross international liabilities in 2007 amounted to 117.98 
times GDP.  
b Export-weighed GDP growth of export partners in the given period, scaled by the export share 
of GDP in 2009.  
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Many proxies of vulnerability may help explain the output performance 
following the global financial crisis. The crisis started by financial distress in 
the USA spreading to Europe, which makes it reasonable to include variables 
depicting the exposure and leverage of the financial sectors in the EU coun-
tries, both externally and internally. Other variables depicting the openness 
and size of the economy and the pre-crisis macroeconomic stance and policy 
may also be of importance. As discussed in Section 2, each of the vulnerabili-
ty variables may affect the size of the contagion shock or the size of the 
effect on output of the contagion shock.  
The variables are typically from 2007 or earlier, i.e. prior to the outbreak 
of the global financial crisis, which essentially makes the vulnerability varia-
bles exogenous to the unfolding of the crisis.  
The private loans 2007 is a stock variable computed as the stock of loans 
to the private sector excluding financial institutions in 2007 relative to GDP 
in 2007. This measure of the financial depth generally attains higher values 
for the EU15 countries than for the CEE countries. The variable can be seen 
as a measure of financial development, but may be denote vulnerability to 
financial  shocks.  The  private  loans  growth  2005-2007  is  the  percentage 
growth  in  loans  to the private  sector  excluding  financial  institutions  from   14 
2005 to 2007. It takes large values in countries that experienced credit-led 
bubbles prior to the crisis. Due to data availability problems for 2005, the 
variable is not available for Cyprus and Slovakia. The loans-to-deposits ratio 
is a measure of financial leverage; a high loans-to-deposits ratio may signal 
financial fragility if deposits are more stable than others sources of funding. 
The  variable  is  above  1  for  many  countries,  i.e.  loans  exceed  deposits, 
suggesting that loans are financed by other means than deposits.
4  
Gross external liabilities are included as liquidity strains in financial mar-
kets may be of particular importance if a country has large foreign liabilities.
5 
The variable is also a proxy of the openness of the financial sector. Luxem-
bourg is a special case as its gross external liabilities as share of GDP are 
many times larger than the second largest observation. The current account 
balance  is  another  measure  of  external  vulnerability.  Calvo  et  al.  (2003, 
2006) argue that sudden stops in countries with initially large current account 
deficits can lead to severe economic downturns. Some EU countries, includ-
ing the Baltic States, Bulgaria, Romania and Greece, had very large current 
account deficits prior to the crisis. The last measure of external vulnerability 
is the net international investment position.  
The export share measures the openness of an economy in terms of trade 
and its dependence on exports. Luxembourg has a very open economy, as ex-
ports in 2007 amounted to 177.3 percent of GDP, while the second highest 
value for exports as a share of GDP was 89.6 percent for Malta.  
Government finance variables may be other measures of vulnerability. The 
debt and balance of the general government exhibit large variation across the 
EU countries. The variables may be seen as affecting capital flows and coun-
try  ratings,  but  also  the  ability  of  governments  to  use  fiscal  policies  to 
counteract the effects of the crisis.  
The size and income level of each of the 27 EU economies are included 
among  the  explanatory  variables.  The  size  of  their  economies  may  have 
shielded some large countries and made them less susceptible to shocks in the 
financial and goods markets. Wide differences between the per capita income 
levels reflect the fact that the EU contains both advanced and emerging eco-
nomies.  
                                                 
4 Kindleberger and Aliber (2005) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) provide comprehensive 
historical narratives of the making of financial crises. Both studies emphasise that crises of-
ten  follow  periods  of  excessive  optimism  in  which  financial  vulnerabilities  are  built  up 
through rapid financial deepening and increased leverage.  
5 We also obtained data on cross-border loans as a percentage of GDP, but the variable is 
not  included  as  it  is  very  closely  correlated  with  the  gross  external  liabilities  variable 
(correlation coefficient = 0.95).   15 
The change in the real effective exchange rate in the years preceding the 
crisis is also included. The rate of real appreciation was higher than the EU 
average for most CEE countries, with the exception of Poland and Slovenia. 
The appreciation of the real effective exchange rate may reflect a process of 
those countries catching-up with the EU15 countries, but may also indicate a 
loss in competitiveness, as seen in the accompanying economic bubbles in 
many countries. Inflation over the five years to 2007 was also above the EU 
average in most CEE countries.  
Two dummy variables capturing the different exchange rate regimes in the 
EU are included. One dummy variable equals 1 for the members of the euro-
zone and 0 otherwise, while the other takes the value 1 for countries with a 
floating exchange rate regime and 0 otherwise. The data for the exchange rate 
regimes are from the De Facto Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes and 
Monetary Policy Frameworks produced by the International Monetary Fund 





Finally, the partner growth variable captures the GDP growth of each EU 
country’s  eight  biggest  export  partners  weighted  by  their  share  of  total 
exports to all eight countries in 2009. The variables are scaled by the export 
share of GDP to take account of openness of the individual countries. A simi-
lar variable is used in Blanchard et al. (2010) to capture the direct impact of 
the trade collapse and has the advantage of being largely exogenous to the 
output performance of each individual country.  
 
Many of the vulnerability variables are closely correlated. This applies in 
particular to the financial variables, which in many cases are correlated by 
definition. GDP per capita in purchasing power terms is highly correlated 
with several other variables such as the current account balance (0.70), net 
international investment position (0.74), loans as a share of GDP (0.82) and 
gross  external  liabilities  (0.80).  These  variables  are  also  highly  correlated 
with exports as a share of GDP (0.76). 
The  correlation  coefficient  between  private  sector  loan  growth  and  the 
current account balance is –0.72 for the 25 countries for which data are avail-
able (see Figure 3). These variables are again correlated with the change in 
the real effective exchange rate and the inflation rate. The pattern is largely 
driven  by  the  CEE  countries  which  experienced  economic  booms  and  in 
many cases overheating in the years prior to the global financial crisis, in part 
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Figure 3: Private loans growth 2005–2007, percent, and the current account 
balance 2007, percent of GDP 
 
 
Taking the explanatory variables together it is possible to paint a simpli-
fied picture of the European economies immediately prior to the outbreak of 
the global financial crisis. The EU15 countries generally exhibited economies 
with high incomes, considerable financial depth (both internally and exter-
nally) and relatively large governments. The CEE countries exhibited econo-
mies with lower per capita income, which in many cases had experienced 
substantial financial deepening, current account deficits and substantial real 
appreciation in the years prior to the crisis.  
 
 
4. Empirical results with only vulnerability variables 
 
This  section  presents  the  results  of  different  econometric  analyses  in 
which the output performance during the crisis is modelled as a function of 
different pre-crisis vulnerabilities. The analysis is complicated by the pres-
ence of multicollinearity between several of the explanatory variables and a 
small number of observations (maximum 27). The identification problems 
that emerge from multicollinearity show up in the form of coefficients that 
are imprecisely estimated and very sensitive to specification changes. The 
upshot is that it is difficult or nearly impossible to identify the relative impor-
tance of different explanatory factors (Mankiw, 1995).    17 
We address the multicollinearity issue pragmatically by initially regressing 
the output performance on one or at most two explanatory variables at a time. 
In this respect we follow the methodology used in all of the econometric 
studies discussed in Section 1. The estimations are undertaken using four dif-
ferent dependent variables, i.e. GDP growth 2008:3–2009:3, GDP growth in 
2009, GDP growth 2008:3–2010:1 and unexpected GDP growth in 2009. As 
might be expected given the correlation of these four variables (see also Fig-
ure 2), the results are very similar across the four different dependent varia-
bles. With very few exceptions, the signs, the sizes of the coefficients and the 
statistical significance levels concur across the four specifications. Table 2 
therefore only shows the results when the dependent variable is the rate of 
GDP growth 2008:3–2009:3; the full results are reported in Appendix B.  
Column (2.1) shows the results of the OLS estimations. The estimation 
using private loans in 2007 as the explanatory variable returns a coefficient 
that is positive and statistically insignificant. In contrast, the private loans 
growth variable attains a coefficient that is negative and statistically signifi-
cant at the 1 percent level.
6 The coefficient to the loans-to-deposits ratio is 
also negative and economically significant. The implication of these results is 
that the size of the loan stock did not in itself make the country more vulnera-
ble, but changes in the loan stock and the loan stock relative to deposits were 
associated with larger output declines after the outbreak of the global finan-
cial crisis.  
The estimations for the external financial variables suggest that the gross 
international liability position was unimportant, while a negative net inter-
national investment position and current account deficits prior to the crisis 
were associated with a weaker GDP performance during the crisis.  
Surprisingly, the openness of the economy measured as a ratio of exports 
to GDP does not correlate with the output performance during the crisis in a 
statistically significant manner in this simple specification. The positive coef-
ficient  of  the  government  debt  variable  suggests  that  countries  with  large 
stocks of accumulated government debt were not “punished” by larger GDP 
contractions during the crisis. The government balance seems unimportant. 
Countries with large economies and high per capita income have done rela-




                                                 
6 The coefficient estimate implies that private loans growth of 100 percent instead of the 
average of 50 percent is associated with a 4 percentage-point larger GDP decline.   18 
Table 2: Regressions with GDP growth 2008:3–2009:3 as dependent variable 
 
  (2.1)  (2.2)  (2.3) 
  OLS, all countries   LAD, all countries  OLS, Baltics 
excluded  
  Coef.  Pseudo R
2  Coef.  Pseudo R
2  Coef.  R
2 
Private loans 2007
a  1.894 
(1.388)  0.044  0.855 
(1.718)  0.039  0.414 
(1.070)  0.009 




(2.702)  0.456  –9.703
***
(2.461)  0.183  –2.150
** 
(0.932)  0.080 
Loans-to-deposits 2007  –7.492
*** 
(2.352)  0.509  –8.214
***
(1.495)  0.204  –2.591
* 





(0.336)  0.021  0.347 
(0.330)  0.016  –0.055 
(0.204)  0.004 
Net international 
investment position 2007 
3.239
* 
(1.671)  0.122  1.833 
(1.169)  0.071  0.772 
(0.814)  0.026 




(0.110)  0.217  0.061 
(0.092)  0.033  0.011 
(0.041)  0.002 
Exports 2007
a  0.598 
(2.059)  0.001  –1.761 
(4.524)  0.032  –2.288 
(2.014)  0.051 




(0.034)  0.317  0.048
** 
(0.018)  0.156  0.036
** 




(0.233)  0.026  –0.176 
(0.197)  0.019  –0.157 
(0.172)  0.038 
GDP 2007  1.655
* 
(0.815)  0.066  0.634 
(1.009)  0.026  0.423 
(0.414)  0.017 




(0.064)  0.091  0.056 
(0.036)  0.091  0.200 
(0.039)  0.010 
Real effective exchange 
rate change 2003–2007 
–0.166
** 
(0.074)  0.360  –0.086 
(0.069)  0.131  –0.047
***
(0.016)  0.079 
Average annual HICP 
inflation 2003–2007 
–0.921 
(0.542)  0.156  –0.413
* 
(0.214)  0.078  –0.407
** 
(0.155)  0.110 
























Note:  White  heteroskedastic  robust  standard  errors  are  shown  in  brackets;  normal  standard 
errors in the MAD estimations. Superscripts 
***,  **,  * denote that the coefficient is statistically 
different from 0 at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of significance respectively. The constant term is 
not reported. 
a Luxembourg is excluded due to extreme values for the explanatory variable. 
  
 
Real exchange rate appreciation during the period 2003–2007 is associated 
with lower GDP growth during the crisis. The effect is relative modest in 
economic  terms,  as  a  10  percentage-point  appreciation  is  associated  with   19 
growth that is around 1.5 percentage points lower. High inflation and a fixed 
exchange rate are also correlated with lower growth. 
Two  main  observations  transpired  from  the  OLS  estimations  in  (2.1) 
where GDP growth during the crisis is explained by pre-existing vulnerabili-
ties taken individually. First, the level or depth of domestic and international 
financial intermediation appears not to have affected the output performance 
in the EU countries, whereas pre-crisis financial deepening and financial lev-
erage are negatively correlated with GDP growth. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate 
the latter findings. 
The second finding is that the results involving statistically significant co-
efficients chart a broad picture of the economies that experienced the largest 
output declines after the global financial crisis. As discussed in Section 2, a 
number of EU countries, in particular the CEE countries but also other coun-
tries in the European periphery, experienced substantial economic booms in 
the years leading up to the crisis. These booms were typically fuelled by large 
capital inflows and rapid growth in lending to households and companies and 
coincided with real appreciation and, in the countries with fixed exchange 
rates, high inflation. The results in (2.1) suggest that these countries were 
vulnerable to the shocks of the global financial crisis, and this resulted in 
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Figure 4: Private loans growth 2005-2007 and GDP growth 2008:3–2009:3; 

































































It  follows  from  Figures  4  and  5  that  there  is  substantial  heterogeneity 
across the countries in the sample and this raises the possibility that outliers 
affect the results unduly. Column (2.2) shows the results when the models are 
estimated using Least Absolute Deviation (LAD) instead of OLS. The results 
are very similar to those in (2.1) obtained using OLS; the sign to the export 
variable is now negative but the estimated coefficient is highly insignificant.  
The downturn in the wake of the global financial crisis was more pro-
nounced in most of the CEE countries than in the EU15 countries. The three 
Baltic States represent the most extreme case, with output falling by 14 per-
cent or more from 2008:3 to 2009:3. Column (2.3) shows the results when 
the Baltic States are excluded. The results of the estimations change some-
what. The coefficients generally become smaller (in numerical terms), but the 
sign and statistical significance are retained in many cases. The coefficients 
to the private loans growth 2005–2007 and the loans-to-deposits remain sta-
tistically significant at the 10 percent level, but the estimated coefficients are 
smaller (in numerical terms) than those in the full sample. The coefficients to 
the current account balance 2007 and the net investment position 2007 re-
main positive, but they are not statistically significant.    21 
The conclusion is that the added variability from the Baltic States is im-
portant for the baseline results in both statistical and  economic terms, al-
though removing them from the sample does not lead to conclusions that fun-
damentally contradict those obtained using the full sample. Moreover, the 
exercise of removing countries with large variation brings in an element of 
randomness, which can be illustrated in Figure 5. If the Baltic States are re-
moved the negative correlation between the loans-to-deposit ratio and GDP 
growth  2008:3–2009:3  is  weakened,  but  if  alternatively  Denmark  and 
Sweden are removed, the correlation would have become even stronger.  
The explanatory variables are entered individually in the regressions re-
ported in Table 2. This leaves the possibility that an omitted variables bias 
affects the results. To address this issue we proceed by undertaking an esti-
mation in which all the explanatory variables are included simultaneously. 
The degrees of freedom are very low and the subsequent step is therefore to 
apply different backward stepwise procedures. Table 3 shows the results. 
Column (3.1) shows the result when all explanatory variables are included 
simultaneously. (Luxembourg has been excluded due to extreme values for 
some of its explanatory variables.) The coefficients to all the variables attain 
the same sign as in Column (2.1) with one noticeable exception: the coeffi-
cient to the export variable is now negative and statistically and economically 
significant.  The  many  statistically  insignificant  coefficients  are  a  conse-
quence of the low number of degrees of freedom.  
We address the issue of insignificant coefficients by applying a backward 
stepwise reduction procedure. All variables are initially included and at each 
successive step the variable with the lowest numerical t-value is removed, 
while it is examined whether previously excluded variables attain sufficiently 
high t-values to warrant re-inclusion in the model. The procedure continues 
in as many steps are required to ensure that only variables that are statisti-
cally significant at a predetermined significance level enter the model.  
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Table 3: Regressions with GDP growth 2008:3–2009:3 as dependent variable 
 
  (3.1)  (3.2)  (3.3)  (3.4)  (3.5)  (3.6) 




(1.459)  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Private loans growth 
2005–2007 
–5.528 
(5.659)  ..  ..  –9.257
*** 
(1.433)    –5.187
** 
(2.008) 





















(0.420)  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Net international 
investment position 2007 
–0.632 
(3.310)  ..  ..  4.036
*** 
(1.159)  ..  .. 






(0.066)  ..  ..  ..  .. 
























(0.017)  ..  x  0.081
*** 




(0.549)  ..  ..  x  0.622
** 
(0.294)  x 





(0.151)  ..  –2.724
** 
(0.953)  x  x 
GDP per capita in PPS 
2007 
–0.239 
(0.180)  ..  ..  ..  x  x 
Real effective exchange 
rate change 2003–2007 
0.087 
(0.077)  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Average annual HICP 
inflation 2003–2007 
0.644 
(0.399)  ..  ..  0.512
** 
(0.220)  ..  .. 







(1.748)  ..  –3.333
** 
(1.438)  ..  .. 
Exchange rate dummy: 
float 
–5.470 
(2.920)  ..  ..  ..  2.697
** 
(0.974)  .. 
No. observations   24  24  24  24  24  24 
R
2  0.922  0.840  0.563  0.866  0.747  0.734 
Note: Luxembourg is excluded due to extreme values for some of the explanatory variable. x 
indicates  that  the  variable  has  been  omitted  prior  to  a  general-to-specific  procedure.  White 
heteroskedastic robust standard errors are shown in brackets. Superscripts 
***, **, * denote that the 
coefficient is statistically different from 0 at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of significance respec-
tively. The constant term is not reported.  
 
 
Column  (3.2)  shows  the  result  of  the  general-to-specific  procedure  in 
which all variables are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The re-
sults correspond largely to those attained in the regressions in which the ex-
planatory variables were included separately. The coefficient of the stock of 
private loans is positive, which suggests that deep financial markets did not   23 
worsen  the  downturn.  Domestic  leverage  and  current  account  deficits  are 
associated with deeper downturns. The coefficient to the export share in GDP 
at the outset of the crisis is negative as was also found in the model with all 
variables included. As before, the coefficient to the government debt variable 
is positive.
7 Interestingly, large economies do not seem to have performed 
better during the crisis when the specification conditions are a number of 
other variables, including the export share. The effect of membership of the 
eurozone appears to be negative in this specification. 
Column (3.3) gives the results when only coefficients that are significant 
at the 1 percent level are retained. Only two variables “survive”, i.e. the vari-
ables of domestic financial leverage and trade openness.  
The application of a general-to-specific methodology entails a number of 
complications, in particular if multicollinearity is present (Hamilton, 2009: 
202–203). Because of the mechanical removal of the variable which with the 
lowest numerical t-value, the final results may be very sensitive to changes of 
the initial specification; inclusion or removal of an irrelevant variable in the 
model prior to the general-to-specific procedure may lead to very different 
results. To assess the sensitivity of the results, we undertake a number of esti-
mations in which some of the explanatory variables are removed before the 
general-to-specific methodology is applied.  
Columns  (3.4)–(3.6)  show  the  results  when  different  variables  are  ex-
cluded from the original model before the backward stepwise procedure is 
applied. Variables are retained if they are statistically significant at the 5 per-
cent level. Column (3.4) shows the results when the fiscal variables are ex-
cluded. The results change somewhat, but the main findings remain: the stock 
variables measuring financial depth seem to be of limited importance, while 
measures of financial deepening and leverage prior to the crisis help explain 
the output performance during the crisis. Column (3.5) displays the result 
when the two income variables are excluded and Column (3.6) when both 
government and income variables are excluded. Only three variables are sta-
tistically  significant  in  (3.6),  which  are  private  loans  growth,  loans-to-
deposits and the export share. It is notable that the latter two variables are sta-
tistically significant in all specifications in Table 3. It is also notable that 
exactly the same model as that in (3.6) emerges if a forward stepwise proce-
dure at the 5 percent level is applied (not shown explicitly).  
We have experimented with a sample excluding the Baltic States (as well 
as Cyprus, Slovakia and Luxembourg). Using a general-to-specific methodol-
                                                 
7 A possible interpretation is that a large accumulated debt is an indication that active fis-
cal policies have been pursued in the past and that this policy has been continued during the 
crisis.    24 
ogy starting with all the explanatory variables listed in Table 3 yields results 
that are difficult to interpret. However, if the income variables are excluded, 
the resulting reduced model contains the loans-to-deposit variable, the export 
share and inflation, all with negative coefficients. If the government variables 
are excluded the only variable that “survives” is private loans growth. These 
results  must,  evidently,  be  interpreted  with  great  care  given  the  very  low 
number of degrees of freedom, but the results basically confirm the finding 
from the analysis using only one explanatory variable, namely that measures 
of financial deepening prior to the crisis possess explanatory power and help 
explain the output performance during the crisis.  
As argued above, the general-to-specific methodology suffers from a num-
ber of methodological problems. The substantive or theoretical implications 
of the reduction choices are not considered, and there is no evaluation of the 
possible weaknesses of the models produced at each step. We therefore com-
plement the general-to-specific estimations in Table 3 with some exploratory 
estimations in which different subsets of vulnerability variables are used, in-
cluding variables that reflect possible overheating of the economy. The re-
sults are shown in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4: Regressions with GDP growth 2008:3–2009:3 as dependent variable  
 

































Private loans growth 
2005–2007  ..  –5.247
** 
(2.233)  ..  ..  –6.222
* 
(3.102) 
Current account balance 
2007   ..    0.171
** 
(0.068)  ..  0.062 
(0.083) 
Real effective exchange 





















2  0.569  0.672  0.687  0.660  0.750 
Observations  26  24  26  26  24 
Note: Luxembourg is excluded due to extreme values for some of the explanatory variable. White 
heteroskedastic robust standard errors are shown in brackets. Superscripts 
***, **, * denote that the 
coefficient is statistically different from 0 at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of significance respect-
tively.  
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Column (4.1) shows the results when the loans-to-deposits ratio and the 
exports ratio are included. The result differs marginally from that in Column 
(3.3) in Table 3 because more countries are included in the sample. Columns 
(4.2)–(4.4) show the results when the three main vulnerability measures are 
added to the model individually. Each of the variables is statistically signifi-
cant at least at the 10 percent level and the coefficient estimates appear rea-
sonable. Private loans growth 2005–2007, the current account balance 2007 
and the real effective exchange rate 2003–2007 are highly correlated and it is 
therefore not surprising that the results are quite similar in qualitative terms. 
The correlation partly reflects the fact that the economic booms in many EU 
periphery  countries  in  the  years  prior  to  the  global  financial  crisis  were 
characterised by substantial capital inflows and rapid private loans growth, 
which coincided with appreciation of real effective exchange rates.  
If  all  three  variables  are  included  in  column  (4.5),  only  private  loans 
growth retains statistical significance, while the other variables become sta-
tistically insignificant and the estimated coefficients change markedly. This 
suggests that private loans growth, domestic financial leverage and export de-
pendence are the principal variables explaining the output performance dur-
ing the global financial crisis, although other variables may also have played 
a  role.  These  results  are  broadly  in  accordance  with  the  results  from  the 
general-to-specific procedure shown in Table 3. 
 
 
5. Controling for trade partner growth  
 
In Section 4 the output performance during the crisis was explained using 
only variables that reflected vulnerabilities existing at the outset of the global 
financial crisis. Part of the immediate impact of the global financial crisis 
may, however, also relate to developments outside the individual country. 
The prime example would be economic setbacks in traditional trading part-
ners,  which  affect  export  demand  and,  consequently,  output  performance 
without any immediate  vulnerabilities explaining such a fall (Bems et al., 
2010). Following Blanchard et al. (2010) we include the variable of export-
weighted partner GDP growth, which captures trade collapse and the size of 
the crisis in partner countries.  
Column (5.1) in Table 5 shows the results of regressions when pre-crisis 
vulnerability variables are included individually along with partner growth as 
a control variable. Overall the qualitative results from Table 2 are preserved. 
The private loans growth 2005–2007, the loans-to-deposits ratio, the current 
account balance and the real effective exchange rate retain their significance 
with the control variable included, and the models explain up to 2/3 of the 
variance in output performance. The stock of private loans is insignificant   26 
while the coefficient to the gross international liabilities is positive and statis-
tically significant. It is notable, however, that the estimated coefficients of the 
partner growth vary substantially across the different estimations, although 
they are all positive and above 1.  
Column (5.2) shows the results when the Baltic States are excluded. The 
results correspond to those in Table 2, i.e. the estimated coefficients generally 
retain their sign but become smaller (in numerical terms) and are estimated 
less precisely. Interestingly, when the Baltic States are excluded, the coeffi-
cient for partner growth regressed individually with the dependent variable is 
insignificant. But again the results are dependent on the inclusion of Luxem-
bourg — when the observations for both the Baltic states and Luxembourg 
are excluded, the coefficient for partner growth is 1.095 and it is significant 
at the 1 percent level (the standard error is 0.346). The variables for private 
loans growth and loans-to-deposits remain statistically significant although 
their coefficients fall substantially in numeric terms.  
Analyses that use unexpected growth, i.e. actual growth in 2009 minus 
forecast growth for 2009, as dependent variable give qualitatively the same 
results as when the actual output performance is used (not shown). Interest-
ingly though, when unexpected partner growth is added to the models as a 
control variable, then contrary to other time periods, the coefficient for part-
ner growth is close to zero, as opposed to around or more than one in other 
time periods, and the coefficient is not statistically significant, except in the 
model  with  the  loans-to-deposits  ratio  and  current  account  balance.  This 
would suggest that the pre-crisis fundamentals of each country explain the 
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Table 5: Regression with GDP growth 2008:3–2009:3 as dependent variable 
and weighted partner growth as control variable 
 
  (5.1)  (5.2) 
  All EU countries  Baltic States excluded 
 
Coef.     
vuln.     
variable 





Coef.     
vuln.     
variable 





  ..  1.757
** 
(0.845)  0.329  ..  0.261 
(0.486)  0.018 
Private loans 2007








(0.370)  0.168 










(0.473)  0.090 






















(0.416)  0.175 
Net international 






(0.530)  0.508  1.308 
(0.866) 
0.496 
(0.378)  0.079 







(0.599)  0.499  0.025 
(0.043) 
0.318 











(0.784)  0.219 

















(0.839)  0.330  –0.141 
(0.179) 
0.190 
(0.538)  0.057 




(0.975)  0.330  0.286 
(0.551) 
0.182 
(0.567)  0.024 







(0.439)  0.544  0.054 
(0.053) 
0.573 
(0.410)  0.047 
Real effective exchange 










(0.361)  0.216 











(0.471)  0.122 


















(0.482)  0.046 
Note: White heteroskedastic robust standard errors are shown in brackets. Superscripts 
***, **, * 
denote that the coefficient is statistically different from 0 at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of sig-
nificance respectively. The constant term is not reported. 
a Luxembourg is excluded due to extreme values for the explanatory variable. 
 
Table 6 shows the results of estimations in which the explanatory varia-
bles from Table 4 are augmented by partner growth. Column (6.1) shows the   28 
results when all the variables are included simultaneously; it is notable that 
the  coefficient  to  the  exports  in  2007  attains  what  should  be  the  “wrong 
sign”. The variable is therefore excluded in Column (6.2), but the three addi-
tional explanatory variables, the private loans  growth, the current account 
balance and the real effective exchange rate, are still statistically insignifi-
cant. When the variables are included separately, the first two attain signifi-
cance, while the real effective exchange rate remains insignificant. Overall 
the results from Table 4 appear also to hold in this case in which partner 
growth is included as a control variable.  
 
 
Table 6: Regressions with GDP growth 2008:3–2009:3 as dependent variable   
 


































Exports 2007   2.863 
(4.116)  ..  ..  ..  .. 








(1.301)  ..  .. 





(0.052)  ..  0.102
** 
(0.044)  .. 
Real effective exchange 




(0.056)  ..  ..  0.064 
(0.074) 















2  0.816  0.811  0.806  0.792  0.750 
Observations  24  24  24  26  24 
Note: Luxembourg is excluded due to extreme values for some of the explanatory variable. White 
heteroskedastic robust standard errors are shown in brackets. Superscripts 
***, **, * denote that the 




6. Final comments  
 
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 led to extreme 
instability in global financial markets and, therefore, represents an important 
milestone in the unfolding of the crisis. The shock spread rapidly to the EU 
and eventually resulted in substantial downturns. It is noticeable, however, 
that the effect on output differed markedly across the 27 EU countries. The 
idea of this paper was to examine the extent to which differences in pre-  29 
existing  economic  fundamentals,  measures  of  vulnerability  and  resilience, 
can explain the different economic performance across the 27 countries.  
A number of papers have examined the importance of various measures of 
pre-crisis  vulnerabilities  for  output  performance  after  the  global  financial 
crisis using different datasets, mostly consisting of emerging economies. This 
paper sets out to assess whether the results of these econometric analyses are 
also applicable to the 27 countries in the European Union. The EU countries 
share many institutional characteristics, but exhibit substantial heterogeneity 
regarding economic development and their economic performance prior to 
the crisis.  
In the light of the limited number of observations, the empirical approach 
must  be  kept  simple;  GDP  growth  during  the  crisis  is  regressed  on 
explanatory variables individually or jointly. The use of explanatory variables 
that are dated mainly to the time before the outbreak of the global financial 
crisis reduced concerns about reverse causality. The main problem facing the 
empirical analysis was the difficulty in identifying the effects of individual 
vulnerabilities given substantial multicollinearity and the small sample size. 
Our estimation procedures and the interpretation of the results seek to take 
account of the identification problems that emerge from multicollinearity and 
the small number of data points. 
The main finding in this paper is that the results for the EU countries are 
largely  commensurable  to  those  attained  using  different  datasets  mainly 
consisting of emerging economies. The determinants of output performance 
after the outbreak of the global financial crisis in the EU countries can be 
summarised as follows:  
7.  Variables depicting financial leverage and financial deepening, both do-
mestically and externally, appear to have substantial explanatory power. 
This includes variables such as private loans growth, current account def-
icits, loans-to-deposits and the net international investment position.  
8.  Variables depicting the level of financial depth have either little explana-
tory power or may even have contributed to a better output performance. 
This may signify that countries with deep financial markets have been 
better able to take measures counter-acting the effects of the crisis.  
9.  Variables directly or indirectly capturing the effects on trade also proved 
to be of importance. Countries with large trade volumes prior to the crisis 
or with trading partners that suffered from large output contractions have 
been adversely affected.  
10. Government deficits or government debt stocks do not seem to have af-
fected output negatively, signifying that countries with more profligate 
governments  have  not  been  punished  in  terms  of  output  losses  in  the 
early stages of the global financial crisis.   30 
11. Variables  proxying  the  economic  stance  or  the  degree  of  overheating 
prior to the crisis, i.e. the real effective exchange rate, inflation and the 
exchange rate system, do not provide consistent results in the estima-
tions. The financial sector variables have more explanatory power, possi-
bly because the pre-crisis economic stance in large part was determined 
by financial developments.  
12. The Baltic States stand out for their very large output contractions during 
the global financial crisis. Unsurprisingly the inclusion of these countries 
matters a lot for the results, but this is also the case for other countries 
which are outliers in some of the regressions presented in this paper.  
Much research remains to be done before the causes of the global financial 
crisis and its effect on output performance will be thoroughly understood. 
One  unanswered  question  is  whether  it  is  possible  to  produce  composite 
measures of crisis vulnerability, which would be able to explain output per-
formance or other variables of interest. The indicators of vulnerabilities may 
be computed using principal components or other factor methods. Research 
suggests, however, that even if it is possible to construct such indicators for 
the global financial crisis, they may have little power in forecasting or pre-
dicting the next crisis (Rose and Spiegel, 2010). The factors behind one crisis 
supposedly differ from those behind the next crisis.  
Another unanswered question is whether it is possible to model the output 
effects of the global financial crisis directly, i.e. based on concurrent varia-
bles such as export and capital flows that denote or reflect changes in de-
mand. These variables directly affecting output may in turn be explained by 
vulnerabilities  and  other  country-specific  factors.  We  hope  to  pursue  this 
issue in future research on the economic performance in Europe after  the 
global financial crisis.   31 
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Appendix A: Data sources  
 
Table A.1: Variable names and sources 
 
Variables  Source 
GDP growth  Eurostat; namq_gdp_k 
“Unexpected GDP growth”  IMF (2008a), Eurostat; namq_gdp_k 
Private loans 2007  SDW: MFI balance sheets: non-MFIs excluding 
general government 
Private loans growth 2005–2007  SDW: MFI balance sheets: non-MFIs excluding 
central government 
Loans-to-deposits 2007  SDW: MFI balance sheets: total loans/total 
deposits 
Gross international liabilities 2007  IMF International financial statistics: financial 
account 
Net international investment position  IMF International financial statistics: financial 
account 
Current account balance 2007  Eurostat: tec00043 
Exports 2007  Eurostat: nama_exi_c 
General government debt 2007  Eurostat: gov_dd_edpt1 
General government balance 2007  Eurostat: gov_dd_edpt1 
GDP 2007  Eurostat; nama_gdp_c 
GDP per capita in PPS 2007  Eurostat; nama_gdp_c 
Real effective exchange rate change  
2003–2007   Eurostat; tsdec330 
Average annual HICP inflation  
2003–2007  Eurostat: tsieb060 
Partner growth  Eurostat ComExt: traditional external trade  
Unexpected partner growth   Eurostat ComExt: traditional external trade, IMF 
(2008a) 
Notes: SDW denotes the Statistical Data Warehouse of the European Central Bank, 




Appendix B: Regression results using different measures of GDP performance 
 
Table B.1: Regressions explaining GDP growth after the global financial crisis 
 
  (B1.1)  (B1.2)  (B1.3)  (B1.4) 
  GDP growth  
2008:3–2009:3 
GDP growth 2009  GDP growth  
2008:3–2010:1 
Unexpected GDP  
growth 2009 
  Coef.  R
2  Coef.  R
2  Coef.  R
2  Coef.  R
2 
Private loans 2007
a  1.894 
(1.388)  0.044  1.782 
(1.439)  0.042  2.365 
(1.782)  0.055  3.519
** 
(1.524)  0.138 
Private loans growth 2005–2007  –7.791
*** 
(2.702)  0.456  –7.218
*** 
(2.522)  0.439  –9.502
*** 
(2.508)  0.540  –9.378
*** 
(2.240)  0.617 
Loans-to-deposits 2007  –7.492
*** 
(2.352)  0.509  –7.029
*** 
(2.208)  0.495  –7.757
*** 
(2.584)  0.431  –6.015
** 
(2.485)  0.305 
Gross international liabilities 2007
a  0.250 
(0.336)  0.021  0.227 
(0.323)  0.018  0.293 
(0.418)  0.022  0.375 
(0.429)  0.042 




(1.671)  0.122  2.464 
(1.641)  0.078  3.992
** 
(1.725)  0.146  3.321
* 
(1.830)  0.119 
Current account balance 2007  0.220
* 
(0.110)  0.217  0.183
* 
(0.104)  0.166  0.290
*** 
(0.098)  0.298  0.251
** 
(0.092)  0.264 
Exports 2007
a  0.598 
(2.059)  0.001  –1.533 
(3.066)  0.006  –0.178 
(3.639)  0.000  –3.595 
(3.518)  0.028 
General government debt 2007  0.094
** 
(0.034)  0.317  0.089
*** 
(0.032)  0.316  0.099
** 
(0.037)  0.280  0.116
*** 
(0.030)  0.452 
General government balance 2007  –0.261 
(0.233)  0.026  –0.258 
(0.213)  0.028  –0.178 
(0.235)  0.010  –0.175 
(0.241)  0.011 
GDP 2007  1.655
* 
(0.815)  0.066  1.285 
(0.783)  0.041  1.709
* 
(0.893)  0.056  2.415
*** 
(0.860)  0.131  
  (B1.1)  (B1.2)  (B1.3)  (B1.4) 
  GDP growth  
2008:3–2009:3 
GDP growth 2009  GDP growth  
2008:3–2010:1 
Unexpected GDP  
growth 2009 
  Coef.  R
2  Coef.  R
2  Coef.  R
2  Coef.  R
2 
GDP per capita in PPS 2007  0.117
* 
(0.064)  0.091  0.078 
(0.065)  0.044  0.142
* 
(0.074)  0.105  0.122 
(0.084)  0.092 




(0.074)  0.360  –0.157
** 
(0.067)  0.348  –0.188
** 
(0.067)  0.364  –0.193
*** 
(0.056)  0.440 
Average annual HICP inflation  
2003–2007 
–0.921 
(0.542)  0.156  –0.840 
(0.494)  0.143  –1.221
** 
(0.523)  0.217  –1.154
*** 
(0.410)  0.227 




























Note: White heteroskedastic robust standard errors are shown in brackets. Superscripts 
***, **, * denote that the coefficient is statistically different from 0 at the 1, 
5 and 10 percent levels of significance respectively. 
a Luxembourg is excluded due to extreme values for the explanatory variable. Working Papers of Eesti Pank 2011
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